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subsidy for research funding
Christopher L. Vaughan*
Government policy on research fundinghas a direct impact on the behaviour ofacademics, so we need to ask what sort
of behaviour should be encouraged in South
Africa. Instead of an emphasis on the number
of publications, our focus should rather be on
a subsidy system that inspires our institutions
to aim for a level of scholarship that is able to
withstand the scrutiny of an international
audience. Perhaps now is the time to grasp the
nettle and to consider using the National
Research Foundation’s rating system instead
of the publication count.
Introduction
It has been estimated that advances in
knowledge account for about one-third of
the increases in the gross domestic product
(GDP) of a country.1 Since much of that
knowledge is created within universities
and institutions of higher learning, govern-
ments around the world have adopted
different strategies to stimulate research
in their countries.
In the United Kingdom, the level of
research funding provided by the govern-
ment to individual institutions over the
past two decades has been determined by
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE),
where the focus is on the credentials of a
limited number of the most prominent
researchers at the academic departmental
level.2 The RAE has been criticized over
the years,3,4 which has led to the proposal
of an alternative system, the Research
Excellence Framework (REF), where the
emphasis will be on individual researchers
and the citation of their publications. As
reported by Corbyn,5 the REF has already
drawn considerable criticism among senior
academics. For the past 15 years in Austra-
lia, funding support has been based on a
research quantum which incorporates
research output measures, including the
number of scholarly publications by staff
and students, as well as higher degrees
completed (master’s and Ph.Ds).6 In the
United States, support for research from
the federal government is based primarily
on the assessment of individual research
proposals.1
In South Africa, our current system of
support emanates from the doctoral thesis
of Melck,7 who, working at the University
of Stellenbosch, provided an economic
rationale for government financing of
universities. A report, known as SAPSE-
110, subsequently emerged in 1982 and
was adopted as government policy by the
National Department of Education.8 A
formula was developed which, among
other requirements, included ‘a compo-
nent that is independent of student
numbers so as to reward universities
substantially for meritorious academic
achievements’. The reward was based on
the number of articles published in both
the natural sciences and humanities.
In 2007 the Department of Education
(DoE) provided a total research subsidy of
R1.4 billion to 23 institutions of higher
learning in South Africa.9 To place this
figure in context, two other key scientific
agencies also provided competitive fund-
ing to individual researchers: the National
Research Foundation (NRF) (R111 million
for Focus Area Programmes, R199 million
for the Innovation Fund, and R116 million
for THRIP); and the Medical Research
Council (MRC) (R15 million for self-
initiated research grants, and R22 million
for research units, out of a total govern-
ment grant of R179 million).10
It is clear that significantly more research
funding is available on the ‘supply side’,
via the DoE, compared to the ‘demand
side’, via the Department of Science and
Technology (DST), which funds the NRF,
or the Department of Health (DoH), which
funds the MRC. The politics surrounding
these three agencies, particularly be-
tween the DoE and the DST, cannot be
ignored, however, especially since the
ratio between the two sources of funding
is heavily skewed in favour of the ‘supply
side’. This begs the question: Is such an
approach optimal for driving improve-
ments in the research system in our coun-
try? I would argue that it is not, that the
danger of the ‘supply-side’ model, as
currently implemented, encourages the
pursuit of mediocrity.
There have been some serious criticisms
aimed at our country’s research subsidy
system, particularly the publication sub-
sidy, first by the Academy of Science of
South Africa (ASSAf)11 and more recently
in this journal by Vaughan et al.12 The
purpose of this commentary is to review
the current subsidy system, to describe
the problems specific to the publication
subsidy, to suggest some alternative
approaches and then to discuss the pros
and cons of the proposed alternatives.
Finally, some concluding remarks are
made.
Current system of research subsidy
In November 2003, the minister of
education, Kader Asmal, published the
current policy for the funding of public
higher education.13 The National Plan
proposed that resources for research
should be concentrated in those institu-
tions where there was demonstrated
capacity. It further specified that there
should be greater accountability for the
use of research funds and that research
productivity should be enhanced.
The funding framework made no provi-
sion for research input grants and speci-
fied that research funding, apart from
some development awards, would be
determined solely on the basis of research
outputs. There are two primary types of
research outputs recognized by the DoE:
publications, and postgraduate qualifica-
tions (research master ’s and doctoral
graduates).
Table 1 summarizes the research subsidy
provided to 23 institutions of higher
learning in 2007.14 The normed research
output for 2007 was determined by the
headcount of permanently employed
instructors and research staff in 2005
multiplied by a weighting factor. This
factor is the number of research output
units that each member of staff is expected
to produce per annum. For universities,
the weighting factor is 1.25 and for
universities of technology it is 0.5. For
merged institutions (such as Johannesburg,
Nelson Mandela, South Africa and Walter
Sisulu universities), separate weightings
are applied, as indicated in the footnotes
to Table 1.
The actual research outputs for 2005
were based on the number of research
publications (with a credit value of 1.0),
research master’s graduates (with a credit
of 1.0), and doctoral graduates (with a
credit of 3.0). When a master’s degree is
based on both course work and a thesis,
the credit value varies between 0.5 and
1.0. Research publications include: arti-
cles in journals accredited either by the
Institute for Scientific Information or the
DoE (1.0); books (with a credit value up to
5.0 for a book of 300 pages) and book
chapters (a pro-rated portion of the
book); and peer-reviewed conference
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proceedings (0.5).15 Journal articles have
contributed more than 90% of the publi-
cation outputs for the past two years.16
Each institution’s success in meeting its
research output target is known as ‘deliv-
ery’, which is the ratio of weighted output
to normed output expressed as a percent-
age. A delivery of more than 100% indi-
cates that the institution has exceeded
its target. The ‘shortfall’ is simply the
normed output less the weighted output
and is set equal to zero when delivery
exceeds 100%.
The actual grant earned by an individ-
ual institution in 2007 was equal to the
institution’s weighted research output
multiplied by the total research subsidy
(R1.385 billion) and divided by the
normed output for all institutions. In
2007, one research output credit was
worth R85 026. Those institutions with a
delivery of less than 100% earned a devel-
opment grant, sharing approximately
R148 million, where the amount awarded
was linearly related to their shortfall. Each
institution’s total grant for the year was
the actual grant, based on research outputs,
plus the development grant (Table 1).
The ASSAf report of 2006, while identi-
fying the problems with the use of accred-
ited research outputs for subsidization
purposes, identified certain features of
the policy that were contextually positive.11
The authors argued that the policy was:
able to be reformed; inclusive of all disci-
plines, institutions and scholars; sensitive
to the inherent value of local journals; and
responsive to increased or decreased
outputs in an immediate way.
Problems with the current system
The development grant has obviously
been included in the funding formula
to encourage institutions to develop a
stronger research culture. However, there
are six institutions which earn a greater
development grant than actual grant,
thus establishing a perverse incentive: the
lower their delivery, the greater their total
grant. The unintended consequences of
this policy certainly need to be evaluated.
As highlighted above, the DoE has indi-
cated that it wishes to increase research
outputs and so the publication component
has been included in the funding formula.
Superficially, this seems to be a sensible
method for providing universities with
an incentive to increase research produc-
tivity. Unfortunately, however, this has
led to the ‘least publishable unit’ (worth
R85 026), where there is a powerful
perverse incentive that encourages South
African researchers to publish as many
papers as possible in the least demanding
92 South African Journal of Science 104, March/April 2008 Commentary
Ta
bl
e
1.
G
ra
n
ts
aw
a
rd
ed
to
in
st
itu
tio
ns
in
20
07
w
e
re
ba
se
d
o
n
re
se
a
rc
h
o
u
tp
ut
s
in
20
05
.
20
05
G
ra
n
ts
aw
a
rd
ed
in
20
07
(R
’00
0)
In
st
itu
tio
n
St
af
f
W
e
ig
ht
N
or
m
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
M
as
te
r’s
D
oc
to
ra
te
s
W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
D
el
ive
ry
(%
)
Sh
or
tfa
ll
Ac
tu
al
D
ev
e
lo
pm
en
t
To
ta
l
Ca
pe
Pe
n
in
su
la
62
1
0.
5
31
0.
5
68
.7
46
.0
6
13
2.
7
43
17
8
11
28
0
6
93
9
18
21
9
Ca
pe
To
w
n
82
9
1.
25
1
03
6.
3
89
2.
8
51
2.
8
18
2
1
95
1.
6
18
8
0
16
5
93
5
0
16
5
93
5
Ce
nt
ra
l
20
3
0.
5
10
1.
5
26
.8
9.
5
6
54
.3
54
47
4
61
9
1
84
1
6
46
0
D
ur
ba
n
53
7
0.
5
26
8.
5
23
.4
36
.5
4
71
.9
27
19
7
6
11
6
7
67
0
13
78
6
Fo
rt
H
ar
e
23
0
1.
25
28
7.
5
52
.9
36
.6
1
92
.5
32
19
5
7
86
4
7
60
9
15
47
3
Fr
e
e
St
at
e
62
0
1.
25
77
5.
0
41
1.
0
18
5.
8
65
79
1.
8
10
2
0
67
32
5
0
67
32
5
Jo
ha
nn
es
bu
rg
91
7
[1]
88
6.
8
32
6.
0
26
8.
0
88
85
8.
0
97
29
72
95
1
1
12
2
74
07
4
Kw
a
Zu
lu
-N
at
al
1
44
8
1.
25
1
81
0.
0
94
8.
6
36
4.
3
98
1
60
6.
9
89
20
3
13
6
63
2
7
92
3
14
4
55
6
Li
m
po
po
80
4
1.
25
1
00
5.
0
10
5.
8
40
.5
15
19
1.
3
19
81
4
16
26
5
31
75
1
48
01
6
M
an
go
su
th
u
14
6
0.
5
73
.0
3.
1
0.
0
0
3.
1
4
70
26
2
2
72
8
2
99
0
N
el
so
n
M
an
de
la
55
7
[2]
52
0.
8
20
9.
3
12
8.
5
30
42
7.
7
82
93
36
36
9
3
62
9
39
99
8
N
or
th
-W
e
st
76
9
1.
25
96
1.
3
32
6.
2
29
3.
0
82
86
5.
1
90
96
73
55
9
3
75
0
77
31
0
Pr
et
or
ia
1
57
5
1.
25
1
96
8.
8
1
10
0.
8
49
3.
9
19
2
2
17
0.
7
11
0
0
18
4
56
3
0
18
4
56
3
R
ho
de
s
30
6
1.
25
38
2.
5
25
2.
8
11
4.
0
31
45
9.
8
12
0
0
39
09
3
0
39
09
3
So
ut
h
Af
ric
a
1
30
8
[3]
1
51
8.
0
51
9.
9
12
9.
6
92
92
5.
5
61
59
3
78
68
9
23
12
1
10
1
81
0
St
el
le
nb
os
ch
81
8
1.
25
1
02
2.
5
82
6.
1
47
2.
4
12
6
1
67
6.
6
16
4
0
14
2
55
1
0
14
2
55
1
Ts
hw
a
n
e
88
0
0.
5
44
0.
0
87
.5
70
.2
12
19
3.
7
44
24
6
16
46
8
9
61
2
26
07
9
Va
a
l
31
2
0.
5
15
6.
0
17
.1
10
.0
2
33
.1
21
12
3
2
81
8
4
79
4
7
61
2
Ve
n
da
26
8
1.
25
33
5.
0
26
.9
30
.0
3
65
.9
20
26
9
5
60
3
10
50
0
16
10
4
W
a
lte
rS
isu
lu
53
1
[4]
38
7.
8
31
.7
2.
1
0
33
.7
9
35
4
2
86
7
13
81
4
16
68
2
W
e
st
er
n
Ca
pe
46
5
1.
25
58
1.
3
16
6.
0
16
3.
5
35
43
4.
5
75
14
7
36
94
5
5
72
6
42
67
1
W
itw
a
te
rs
ra
n
d
95
2
1.
25
1
19
0.
0
76
0.
6
31
8.
3
10
1
1
38
1.
9
11
6
0
11
7
49
4
0
11
7
49
4
Zu
lu
la
nd
21
9
1.
25
27
3.
8
44
.3
26
.0
18
12
4.
3
45
14
9
10
56
6
5
83
3
16
39
9
Al
li
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
15
31
5
16
29
1.
5
7
22
8.
2
3
75
1.
4
1
18
9
14
54
6.
6
89
3
80
2
1
23
6
83
6
14
8
36
4
1
38
5
20
0
N
or
m
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
=
St
af
f×
w
e
ig
ht
;[1
]=
57
1
×
1.
25
+
34
6
×
0.
5;
[2]
=
32
3
×
1.
25
+
23
4
×
0.
5;
[3]
=
11
52
×
1.
25
+
15
6
×
0.
5;
[4]
=
16
3
×
1.
25
+
36
8
×
0.
5.
W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
=
Pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
+
M
as
te
r’s
+
3
×
D
oc
to
ra
te
s.
D
el
ive
ry
=
10
0(W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
)/(
No
rm
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
).
Sh
or
tfa
ll
=
N
or
m
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
–
W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
;S
ho
rtf
a
ll
=
0
if
W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
>
N
or
m
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
.
Ac
tu
al
gr
a
n
t=
R
1
38
5
20
0(W
e
ig
ht
ed
o
u
tp
ut
)/(
No
rm
e
d
o
u
tp
ut
fo
r
a
ll
in
st
itu
tio
ns
).
D
ev
e
lo
pm
en
tg
ra
n
t=
[R
13
85
20
0
–
(A
ctu
al
gr
a
n
tf
o
r
a
ll
in
st
itu
tio
ns
)]×
[(S
ho
rtfa
ll)/
(S
ho
rtfa
ll
fo
r
a
ll
in
st
itu
tio
ns
)].
To
ta
lg
ra
n
t=
Ac
tu
al
gr
a
n
t+
D
ev
e
lo
pm
en
tg
ra
n
t.
journals. Instead of encouraging publica-
tion in high-impact but demanding inter-
national journals with high rejection
rates, researchers and their institutions
are rewarded for short reports of dubious
validity and value in fifth-rate journals.12
Only 57% of journal articles accepted for
the publication count in 2006 were pub-
lished in journals that were internation-
ally accredited.16
Other problems with the DoE’s subsidi-
zation policy based on research outputs
were described in some detail in the
ASSAf report.11 These may be summarized
as: the use of a bureaucratic as opposed to
a peer-review approach to the accredita-
tion of South African journals; ignoring
field-specific variations in the annual
rates of publication; a bias against co-
authorship with international collabora-
tors (e.g. an article in Nature where there
is one South African author and three
foreign co-authors earns 0.25 credits,
whereas a paper in a local journal by four
authors from a single institution, where
the editorial board may even be from the
same institution, yields 1.0 credits); and
the absence of other stakeholders (besides
the DoE) in developing the policy.
The authors of the ASSAf report believed
that these problems were not insur-
mountable and made certain recommen-
dations to reform the policy.11 These
included: peer-review, by an ASSAf panel,
of local journals grouped by discipline
where the recommendations would be
transparent and evidence-based; consid-
eration of the method by which the credit
value system was calculated, taking into
account different fields and international
collaboration; and the convening of a
national forum for all stakeholders to
discuss reform of the policy. To date, that
forum has not yet been convened.
One of the major drawbacks of the
current system is the amount of time
required to assemble the necessary data.
While counting (and verifying) the number
of staff, and the number of master’s and
doctoral graduates is relatively straight-
forward, the same cannot be said for the
publication output. Because many journal
articles have multiple authors with various
affiliations, support staff, both within
academic departments and central uni-
versity administrations, spend an inordi-
nate amount of time determining what
proportion of the publication unit count
should be attributed to a particular insti-
tution. In addition, a high-level evaluation
panel – with representatives from six
universities, ASSAf and the DoE – in 2007
sat for two days to consider 2283 submis-
sions of books, book chapters and confer-
ence proceedings.16 Of these submissions,
959 were rejected whereas those accepted
represented less than 10% of all publica-
tions for the year. This is a rather poor
yield for the amount of time spent by 15
people.
Of course, the issue of ‘time/effort’ in
the current system – and the huge amount
of funding that flows from the state to
institutions via this channel – should also
be seen in the context of the significant
‘time/effort’ required by researchers and
their students to secure very modest
grants from the NRF and MRC. The balance
between ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’
funding should probably swing towards
the latter, where the emphasis has tradi-
tionally been based on peer review.
Although the publication count does
include publications other than journal
articles, it has been suggested that the
credit values are totally inappropriate.
Higgins17 has argued that a 100 000-word
monograph in the humanities which
could make a substantial contribution to
scholarship – and therefore have a major
impact in terms of the recognition for the
individual, his or her institution and
South Africa – can take up to three years
to produce and yet contribute a small
fraction of the subsidy generated by a
natural scientist during the same period.
It is also conceivable that certain books,
such as those novels authored by J.M.
Coetzee, which led to his Nobel Prize in
Literature, would not qualify for research
subsidy.
Some South African universities have
provided incentives to their academics
by passing a portion of the publication
subsidy back to the individual staff
member who authored the publication.
While on the face of it this could be con-
sidered a reasonable strategy to improve
research productivity, it does have some
serious drawbacks. First, it rewards those
who pursue the least publishable unit
(described above). Second, it favours aca-
demics whose research field is conducive
to multiple annual papers (such as zoolo-
gists) versus those who may publish
only one or two papers per annum (for
instance mathematicians) or those who
publish important policy documents that
draw no subsidy at all (for example, public
health specialists). Third, there is the
distinct possibility that such funds, even
when paid into a research fund rather
than directly into the individual staff
member’s personal bank account, may be
considered a personal benefit by the
South African Revenue Service and would
therefore be liable to personal income tax.
Since the mission of the NRF is to
contribute to the knowledge economy in
South Africa, they have set the target of
attaining at least 1% of global R&D output
by 2015.18 One measure would be a greater
share of publications indexed by the Insti-
tute for Scientific Information (ISI), and
there was indeed a steady increase in
ISI-accredited publications between 1990
and 2002, while the number of publications
in DoE-accredited journals was static.11
The Australian experience has revealed
that their funding formula, which also
encourages publication, has led to a 25%
increase in their share of global publica-
tions19 but, because there is no differentia-
tion among journals, it has been at the
expense of quality: the greatest gains
have been in the journals with the lowest
impact factors.20
Some alternatives to the publication
subsidy
Just as the number of publications by
individual researchers serves as a proxy
for the research output of an institution,
so too can the NRF ratings be seen as a
proxy for an institution’s scholarly out-
put.21 In fact, the NRF ratings are a direct
measure of the degree to which an institu-
tion aspires to international recognition
for its research activities. My first alterna-
tive funding model is therefore the re-
placement of the publication count with
an institution’s NRF ratings, as illustrated
in Table 2. The credit values for research
master’s (1.0) and doctoral degrees (3.0)
have been retained, as has the provision
of a development grant.
In deciding what the credit values for
NRF ratings should be, two guidelines
have been applied: (1) the relative weight-
ing of the ratings in the NRF’s proposed
multi-criteria decision making (MCDM)
tool22 has been adopted; and (2) the total
weighted rating for all institutions should
be approximately equal to the total number
of publications for all institutions in Table 1
(7228). On this basis, an A rating has been
valued at 8.0 research output credits, the
B and P ratings at 6.0 credits, the C and Y
ratings at 4.0 credits, and the L rating
given a value of 2.0 credits. As seen in
Table 2, the total weighted rating for all
institutions is 7224.
The ratings grant for an individual
institution is, as before, equal to the insti-
tution’s weighted output multiplied by
the total research subsidy (R1.385 billion)
and divided by the normed output for all
institutions (cf. Table 1). In comparing the
total grant for the current system (Table 1)
with the alternative system based on NRF
ratings (Table 2), it is evident that some
institutions (Free State, KwaZulu-Natal,
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UNISA and Pretoria) would see a sub-
stantial reduction in their total grant,
while others (Cape Town, Stellenbosch
and the Witwatersrand) would derive a
substantial increase.
As indicated above, the development
grant of R148 million represents more
funding than the NRF spends on its focus
area programmes. It would certainly
appear, on the evidence of the research
outputs and NRF ratings in Tables 1 and 2,
that the administrators of the universities
benefiting from these grants are using the
funds for various activities, most of them
unrelated to research. In the next four
alternative funding models proposed, the
development grant has been removed
(Table 3).
With the development grant removed,
and the full R1.385 billion allocated accord-
ing to the existing research output model
(which is based on publications and post-
graduates), there would be some signifi-
cant changes (Table 3). All institutions
with a delivery score of more than 100%
would be major beneficiaries, whereas
those with large shortfalls such as Lim-
popo and UNISA (Table 1) would see
significant reductions in their subsidy.
When the output is determined by a
research output model based on NRF
ratings and postgraduates, the changes
would be even more dramatic, with insti-
tutions such as Cape Town, Stellenbosch
and Witwatersrand seeing significant
gains (Table 3).
A third ‘hybrid’ model, based on research
outputs and incorporating publications,
postgraduates and NRF ratings, has also
been included in Table 3. Again there is no
development grant and, as seen in Tables 1
and 2, the total weighted outputs for the
three components are approximately
equal: publications (7228); postgraduates
(7318); and NRF ratings (7224). Given
these weightings, the hybrid model has a
less dramatic effect across all the institu-
tions (Table 3).
In its recently published strategic plan,
the NRF has stated that by 2015 it would
like to double the number of Ph.D. gradu-
ates.18 The DST’s Ten-Year Innovation
Plan has set even more ambitious targets,
suggesting that by 2018 South Africa
should increase the annual output of
Ph.Ds by a factor of five.23 With these aspi-
rations in mind, I have included a fourth
model (also without the development
grant) based solely on the number of
Ph.D. graduates produced by each insti-
tution (Table 3). Compared with the exist-
ing model (Table 1), there are some
interesting differences, with Cape Town
and Pretoria being the main beneficiaries
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and two institutions (Mangosuthu and
Walter Sisulu) earning no subsidy at all.
The pros and cons of the alternative
systems
The first major benefit of a system based
on NRF ratings would be the huge savings
in time. All the work has already been
done by the NRF’s evaluation panels. Sec-
ond, the data are transparent and readily
available on the NRF’s website.24 In con-
trast, there is, at the moment, no publicly
available document which records what
proportion of an institution’s publications
are in internationally accredited journals.
In other words, it is not possible to judge
the quality of an institution’s research
output by studying the publication count.
Third, the NRF ratings are updated annu-
ally and thus reflect the impact of an insti-
tution’s researchers in the recent past.
Fourth, the NRF ratings are based on
peer review by national and international
experts in the field. Fifth, the NRF recog-
nizes scholarly output other than journal
publications (such as artefacts, prototypes
and policy documents). Sixth, since 2002
the NRF rating system has been available
to all disciplines. At the University of
Cape Town, for example, we have artists,
lawyers and accountants with an NRF rat-
ing. Finally, the system has been in opera-
tion for more than 20 years and is
considered to be relatively robust.
However, what about the potential
problems with this alternative approach?
First, there is the fact that only 1589
researchers in South Africa have a rating
(Table 2), representing just 10% of the
15 315 permanent staff who are eligible
for rating (Table 1). Of course, it could also
reasonably be argued that a small propor-
tion (perhaps just 10%) of these 15 315
permanent staff contribute to research
publications each year.
In 2005, an independent panel, consist-
ing of three foreign research experts and
three local panellists, conducted an insti-
tutional review of the NRF.25 Over a 12-
day period, the panel interviewed more
than 400 stakeholders in three cities. The
review panel was highly critical of the
ratings system and identified the main
problem areas as: controversy provoked
by the system; lack of coherence within
assessment instruments; relationship
between ratings and funding; difficulties
with the ‘one size fits all’ model; opera-
tional problems; and concerns about
systemic sources of bias.
The sources of bias in the rating system
reported by some researchers included:
emphasis on a ‘one person, one paper’
model of publishing at the expense of
multi-authored publications; bias in favour
of long-term involvement in a single area
compared with scholars whose research
migrated across a number of topics and
disciplinary boundaries; and difficulty in
securing a high rating in a field that is
vast. In the light of all these concerns, the
panel recommended that a task group be
convened by the higher education sector
to consider the future of the NRF rating
system.25
The panel’s recommendation was
adopted in 2007 by Higher Education
South Africa (HESA) and the NRF, which
conducted on extensive review of the
rating system. Among the problems iden-
tified was that the system valued interna-
tional standing above local standing and
local journals, long-term track records
above short-term activity, and inherent
flaws that may not be amenable to reform.
Despite these misgivings, the HESA/NRF
report felt strongly that the rating system
should be retained, and concluded that
there was ‘no evidence to discontinue the
system for the evaluation and rating of
individual researchers’.26 They also recog-
nized that rating should be directly linked
to funding, that the NRF should address
the criticisms of the rating system, and
that the NRF or HESA should lobby for
sufficient levels of funding to sustain the
rating system.
In a recently published synthesis of the
HESA/NRF report, Auf der Heyde and
Mouton27 reported that key sectors of
academia regard the rating system with
growing scepticism and disillusionment.
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Table 3. Six models for research subsidy, in four of which the development grant has been removed.
Table 1 Table 2 No development grant
Institution* Existing NRF ratings Existing NRF ratings Hybrid Ph.D.
Cape Peninsula 18 219 15 458 12 634 6 903 10 732 6 990
Cape Town 165 935 205 323 185 840 260 013 210 452 212 032
Central 6 460 6 054 5 174 4 218 4 857 6 990
Durban 13 786 15 553 6 850 8 437 7 376 4 660
Fort Hare 15 473 12 693 8 807 3 835 7 157 1 165
Free State 67 325 57 889 75 401 57 525 69 469 75 726
Johannesburg 74 074 71 866 81 702 57 525 73 680 102 521
KwaZulu-Natal 144 556 120 713 153 022 128 089 144 749 114 171
Limpopo 48 016 41 988 18 216 6 519 14 335 17 475
Mangosuthu 2 990 2 905 293 383 323 0
Nelson Mandela 39 998 39 048 40 732 37 966 39 814 34 950
North-West 77 310 80 193 82 383 69 030 77 952 95 531
Pretoria 184 563 173 954 206 702 187 148 200 214 223 682
Rhodes 39 093 37 326 43 783 44 486 44 016 36 115
South Africa 101 810 86 403 88 128 64 811 80 391 107 181
Stellenbosch 142 551 161 076 159 651 200 187 173 102 146 792
Tshwane 26 079 25 294 18 443 14 956 17 286 13 980
Vaal 7 612 6 676 3 156 1 150 2 490 2 330
Venda 16 104 14 182 6 275 767 4 448 3 495
Walter Sisulu 16 682 14 703 3 211 1 534 2 655 0
Western Cape 42 671 52 376 41 376 53 690 45 462 40 775
Witwatersrand 117 494 126 288 131 588 165 672 142 898 117 666
Zululand 16 399 17 240 11 834 10 354 11 343 20 970
All institutions 1 385 200 1 385 200 1 385 200 1 385 200 1 385 200 1 385 200
Total grant for existing model is repeated from Table 1.
Total grant for NRF ratings model is repeated from Table 2.
Total grant for existing model  without development grant = R1 385 200(Weighted output)/(Weighted output for all institutions) [Table 1].
Total grant for NRF ratings model  without development grant = R1 385 200(Weighted output)/(Weighted output for all institutions) [Table 2].
Total grant for hybrid model = R1 385 200(Weighted output from Table 1 + Weighted NRF ratings from Table 2)/(Weighted output for all institutions).
Total grant for Ph.D. model = R1 385 200(Doctorates)/(Doctorates for all institutions).
Some researchers, such as Cherry and
Gibbons,28 have expressed serious misgiv-
ings about the NRF rating system, suggest-
ing it is ‘an idea whose time is long past’,
that it undermines academic collegiality
in the country and that it should be ‘aban-
doned before further damage is done’. It
is unclear whether these comments on
the NRF rating system represent the
views of the majority of rated academics
or whether they reflect the authors’
personal bias in the context of their own
rating.
In one of the only serious scientific
analyses of the NRF rating system con-
ducted to date, Lovegrove and Johnson29
compared the ratings of 163 South African
botanists and zoologists with well-recog-
nized bibliometric scores (such as the
h-index and number of citations per pub-
lication) and found a good correlation.
However, the peer-reviewed NRF ratings
explained less than 40% of the variation in
the scores. They concluded that a synergy
between the peer-review system (NRF
rating) and bibliometric scores would im-
prove the assessment of scientific quality.
Another criticism of the proposed alter-
native systems of research subsidy is that
my own institution, the University of
Cape Town, would be one of the main
beneficiaries, with its subsidy increasing
by R40 million, an increase of almost 25%
(cf. Tables 1 and 2), and even greater
increases with the removal of the devel-
opment grant (Table 3). Besides NRF
ratings, however, there are two other
measures that provide a gauge of UCT’s
research output and accomplishments:
(1) it is the only South African institution
ranked between 200 and 300 in the world
rankings by the Shanghai Jiao Tong Uni-
versity30 and is ranked in the top 200 by
the Times Higher Education Supplement31;
and (2) it currently has one-third of the
DST/NRF research chairs in the country.32
Concluding remarks
Government policy on research fund-
ing has a direct impact on the behaviour
of academics, whether they are in the
UK,5 Australia,20 the US1 or South Africa.11
The question that needs to be asked is
this: What sort of behaviour do we wish to
encourage in South Africa? Should we be
rewarding universities whose academics
produce the greatest number of publica-
tions, without regard to quality, or should
our emphasis be on a system that inspires
our academics to aim for a level of scholar-
ship which can withstand the scrutiny of
an international audience? I believe it is
the latter.
If the current system of publication
subsidy is replaced by one based on NRF
ratings, then the NRF will have to ensure
that individual researchers receive an
annual incentive linked to their rating.
This would go a long way to allaying any
fears researchers may harbour that their
ratings (like their publications) benefit the
institution but not the individual. It would
appear that such a policy has recently
been implemented.33 It is evident that
the rating system requires a significant
administrative commitment by the NRF.
For example, a total of 11 356 reviewers
were approached during the period 2003
to 2006.21 If the number of rated academics
were to double to 3000 because of the
subsidy system, the NRF would need to
have the resources to manage this growth.
Another challenge for the NRF in
sustaining the rating system will be to
address the substantial social costs of the
peer-review system, particularly from the
perspective of the individual researcher.
As highlighted by Pouris,34 over 200 re-
searchers let their ratings lapse between
2000 and 2004. There should, therefore,
be an incentive for academics to aspire to
an NRF rating.
In conclusion, it is evident that the
publication subsidy serves as an extremely
blunt instrument that probably has far
more problems than benefits. In Novem-
ber 2003, the Education Ministry declared
itself ‘committed to considering the inclu-
sion of additional indicators of research
outputs in future years, as new national
research policies are developed and
implemented’.13 Perhaps now is the time
to grasp the nettle and to consider using
the NRF rating system instead of (or in
addition to) the publication count.
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